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Abstract 
The choice of contract allocation mechanism in procurement affects such aspects of transactions as information exchange 
between buyer and supplier, supplier competition, pricing and, eventually, performance. In this study we investigate the 
buyer’s choice between reverse auctions and bilateral negotiations as an allocation mechanism for IT services contracts. 
Prior studies into allocation mechanism choice focused on factors pertaining to discrete exchange situation, such as con-
tract complexity or availability of suppliers. We broaden the research by focusing on buyers’ past exchange relationships 
with vendors. Based on the literature on the economics of contracting and agency theory, we hypothesize that prior re-
peat interaction with vendors favors the use of negotiations over auctions in the next transaction, while the need to ex-
plore the marketplace due to buyer’s inexperience or dissatisfaction with vendor’s performance in the most recent project 
leads to the use of auctions instead of negotiations. We find support for these hypotheses in a longitudinal dataset of 
2,081 IT projects realized by 91 repeat buyers at a leading online services marketplace over a period of eight years. 
Taken together, the results show that analyzing B2B auctions and negotiations should move beyond analyzing discrete 
instances and instead analyze them in the context of the individual firm’s history and supplier strategy. 
 
Keywords: reverse auctions, online marketplace, IT services, outsourcing. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years auctions received a boost from the rise of internet technologies and became a popu-
lar tool in corporate procurement, known as “online reverse auctions”. However, the discussion on 
which transactions are appropriate for online reverse auctions to be used as allocation mechanism 
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has been intense both in the business press and academic literature. While some authors embraced 
online reverse auctions as a way to optimize procurement, reduce prices, and contribute to process 
improvement (Smart & Harrison, 2002), others warned about potential negative impact on buyer-
supplier relationships and supplier performance (Emiliani & Stec, 2002; van Tulder & Mol, 2002). 
Choosing the right allocation mechanism is particularly important for transactions involving custom-
ized products and services (Goldberg, 1977) such as unique manufacturing parts and equipment, 
building construction services or customized software. In such transactions buyers and suppliers can 
to a lesser extent rely on exhaustive specifications and ready to use industry standards (Snir & Hitt, 
2003) and have to exchange more information regarding the product and transaction terms 
(Goldberg, 1977). Also, many projects such as the ones in the building construction industry are 
prone to ex-post adjustments that are better dealt with by “cost plus” contracts (rather than fixed-
price contracts), commonly associated with negotiations rather than reverse auctions (Bajari, 
McMillan & Tadelis, 2006). Furthermore, negotiations are found to better facilitate information ex-
change when complex contracts are involved and the level of non-contractibility is high; they are 
also used when buyer has a high preference for quality (Bonaccorsi, Lyon, Pammolli & Turchetti, 
2000; Mithas, Jones & Mitchell, 2005; Bajari et al., 2006), whereas auctions are favored when con-
tracts are less complex, the pool of available suppliers is large and costs of conducting auctions are 
lower than those of negotiations (Leffler, Rucker & Munn, 2003; Bajari et al., 2006).  
As useful as these results are, past studies were limited to studying choices for isolated transactions 
and there is a concern that such a “discrete” perspective does not allow to take in account other im-
portant contextual factors that affect actors behavior and transaction outcomes (Rothkopf & Har-
stad, 1994; Pinker, Seidmann & Vakrat, 2003; Elmaghraby, 2007). These factors include information 
exchange (Goldberg, 1977), past relationships between partners (Jap, 2002) and expectations of fu-
ture business (Heide & Miner, 1992). The latter factors are particularly important in procurement as 
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buyers conduct transactions that tend to repeat over time between buyers and vendors (Pinker et al., 
2003; Elmaghraby, 2007) and hence aspects of the buyer-vendor relationship can be expected to play 
a role. In this study we address this gap in the literature by studying how a buyer’s prior repeat inter-
action with vendors affects the choice between reverse auctions and bilateral negotiations for the 
next transaction.  
From the extant literature we identify several mechanisms (such as vendor learning in software pro-
jects (Whang, 1995), vendor’s specific investments (Richmond, Seidmann & Whinston, 1992) and 
costly bid evaluation (Snir et al., 2003)) that provide a connection between the past buyer-supplier 
exchange interaction and the choice of allocation mechanism. Based on these insights we develop 
our argument and hypothesize that repeat interactions with vendors will favor the use of negotia-
tions, while poor performance in the most recent project will lead to auctioning the subsequent pro-
ject. Also, we hypothesize that, since new buyers need to explore the marketplace, they are also more 
likely to prefer reverse auctions as this is an appropriate tool for discovering the supply. 
The testing of our hypotheses is conducted on a sample of 2,081 IT projects realized by 91 repeat 
buyers in the period of 1999-2006 at a leading online marketplace for IT services. In such market-
places, buyers use both open reverse auctions and bilateral negotiations for project allocation, which 
makes this platform a suitable ground for our empirical investigation. The results of the analysis 
demonstrate that the more intensive prior repeat interaction is between buyer and vendors – the 
more likely she is to use negotiations rather than auction to allocate her next contract.  By contrast, 
auctions are preferred by buyers who want to switch to a different vendor when performance of in-
cumbents becomes unsatisfactory, or when buyers are new to the marketplace and need to explore 
the supply (although the latter effect is small). 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start by reviewing literature on allo-
cation mechanism choice and contract choice that is followed in Section 3 by hypotheses develop-
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ment where we also draw on the literature on the economics of software development. In Section 4, 
we discuss the methodology of the empirical analysis and introduce the empirical setting in more 
detail. The results of the analysis are presented in Section 5. A discussion and conclusions follow in 
Sections 6 and 7. 
 
2. Literature, Empirical Context and Hypotheses  
Allocation mechanism choice 
The choice of contract allocation mechanism in procurement affects such aspects of transactions as 
information exchange between buyer and supplier, supplier competition, pricing and, eventually, 
performance. Some of the most widely used allocation mechanisms in procurement are reverse auc-
tions and negotiations. Negotiations better facilitate information exchange when complex contracts 
are involved and the level of non-contractibility is high; they are also used when buyer has a high 
preference for quality (Bonaccorsi et al., 2000; Mithas et al., 2005; Bajari et al., 2006). Auctions are 
favored when contracts are less complex the pool of available suppliers is large and costs of con-
ducting auctions are lower than those of negotiations (Leffler et al., 2003; Bajari et al., 2006). 
An early study by Goldberg (1977) viewed auctions, along with other allocation mechanisms, pri-
marily as a means of transmitting information between organizations, where product complexity 
plays an important role: “The properties (and the relative efficacy) of competitive bidding mecha-
nisms will depend crucially on the subject matter of the bidding competition” (Goldberg, 1977: 250-
251). Goldberg proposes that competitive bidding may be not always appropriate for complex trans-
actions, such as provisioning of public utility services, because the customization requires costly in-
formation provision at the pre-contract stage that can make this type of allocation mechanism too 
expensive (Goldberg, 1977).  
 5
This reasoning has been taken further in Bajari et al. (2006) who focused on the implications of pro-
ject complexity for the allocation mechanism choice and identified two reasons why higher complex-
ity is better served by negotiations rather than auctions. The first reason is auctions’ poor ability to 
facilitate information exchange when the input from suppliers is needed. In complex projects such 
information exchange is important e.g. with regards to “how to deal with adaptation due to unfore-
seen events and problems” (Bajari et al., 2006: 9). Absence of information exchange can lead to ad-
verse selection, where suppliers can submit low bids with an intention to extract profits from ex-
pected changes in the course of the project. 
The second reason is that (in the context of building construction industry where their empirical re-
search is conducted) negotiations have been traditionally associated with “cost-plus” contracts and 
auctions are associated with fixed price contracts. Cost-plus contract is a more viable option for 
complex projects, where ex-post adaptations regularly occur. An empirical test on the dataset of 
construction projects showed a positive association between project complexity and the use of nego-
tiations (Bajari et al., 2006). Another finding of Bajari et al (2006) was a positive relationship between 
the number of available suppliers and the use of reverse auctions. 
Similar results regarding the effect of project complexity and the number of available buyers have 
been produced in a study of sales of private timber tracts (Leffler et al., 2003). In addition, they 
found that auctions are more likely to be used when the dispersion of the valuation of the good 
among bidders is higher and when using auction is cheaper than using negotiations (Leffler et al., 
2003). 
Other studies theoretically contrast price and quality as the factors of allocation mechanism choice. 
Manelli and Vincent (1995) consider an environment where the quality of goods or services is un-
known to the buyer ex-ante and cannot be verified by the courts ex-post. In their model, when the 
preference for quality is high the buyer is better off choosing sequential negotiations with potential 
 6
suppliers instead of auctions (Manelli & Vincent, 1995). Tunca and Zenios (2006) consider pro-
curement of manufacturing parts, where high-quality parts can be procured from one supplier under 
a relational contract and low-quality parts are procured from the market via a second-price reverse 
auction. High preference for quality leads to procuring manufacturing parts from the relational con-
tract, low preference for quality stimulates the use of reverse auctions, while there is also a situation 
of moderate preference for quality where the two mechanisms can co-exist and auction-driven com-
petition can lead to the enhancement of self-enforceability of relational contracts (Tunca & Zenios, 
2006). The link between the quality concerns and the choice for negotiations has been empirically 
validated in the context of medical devices procurement in Italian hospitals (Bonaccorsi et al., 2000).  
Along similar lines, Mithas et al (2005) hypothesized that buyers are less likely to use reverse auc-
tions for procuring goods that are high on non-contractibility (this includes dimensions such as qual-
ity, supplier innovativeness, information sharing, responsiveness, trust, and flexibility) and asset-
specificity and confirmed the relationships though the analysis of survey data in the US automotive 
industry (Mithas et al., 2005).  
Finally, an auction-theoretical analysis by Bulow and Klemperer (1996) in the context of selling a 
company showed that in case when at least one additional bidder is expected to bid in the auction, 
the buyer should choose for an auction instead of negotiating (Bulow & Klemperer, 1996). The re-
sult holds for a case where bidders’ values are independent and, under certain restrictions, for affili-
ated values.  
To our knowledge, no prior research into allocation mechanism choice explicitly addressed the role 
of repeat contracting, while in the closely related filed of contracting literature is has been recognized 
as a major determinant of contract choice. We review these studies in the next sub-section. 
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Effect of repeat interaction on contract choice 
Contract choice literature investigates factors determining contract design using the logic of transac-
tion cost economics and agency theory. Contract choice literature is concerned with identifying the 
effect of these and other factors on the preference for particular contract form or identifying a con-
tract form that maximizes buyer’s value in an exchange situation with a given set of characteristics. 
Factors that affect contract choice include contract (project) complexity (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001), 
uncertainty (Kalnins & Mayer, 2004) measurement costs (Allen & Lueck, 1993), moral hazard 
(Lafontaine, 1992) supervision costs (Alston, Datta & Nugent, 1984) and enforcement costs (Allen 
& Lueck, 1992). For instance, it has been found that project complexity is better dealt with by time 
and materials (in construction – cost-plus) contracts rather than fixed fee contracts (Bajari et al., 
2001), same as ex-ante uncertainty regarding the costs and project specification (Kalnins et al., 2004). 
More often than not, the analysis of contract choice centers on characteristics of an exchange situa-
tion at hand, such as the ones listed above. It is only recently that the research attention started to 
encompass also the history of interaction between contracting parties. There are a number of ways 
prior interaction can affect contract choice for a present exchange situation. Kalnins and Mayer 
(2004) summarize factors identified by sociologists and institutional economists and identify four 
such mechanisms: 1) trust; 2) established pattern of collaboration and norms of interaction; 3) de-
crease of contracting costs due to accumulated contracting expertise; 4) expectation of future busi-
ness (Kalnins et al., 2004). 
Several recent empirical studies addressed the effect of repeat interaction on contract choice. Gulati 
(1995) found that repeated alliances between partners are more likely to be set up without the use of 
equity than first-time alliances. This is interpreted is an evidence of the positive impact of trust es-
tablished between the parties in prior alliance on the reduction of the suspicion of opportunism in 
the new alliances (Gulati, 1995). By contrast, in a study of the Indian software industry Benerjee and 
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Duflo (2000) find no significant effect of prior contracts on the choice between fixed-cost, mixed 
and time-and-material contracts (Banerjee & Duflo, 2000). Despite these mixed earlier results, fur-
ther evidence on the effect of repeat interaction on contract choice has been provided by two more 
recent studies. First, Corts and Singh (2004) argued that repeat interaction might alleviate the prob-
lems of contracting costs and incentive problems in fixed-price and cost-plus contracts. In their em-
pirical study of offshore oil drilling industry they found a positive relationship between repeat inter-
action and the use of day-rate contracts (equivalent to time-and-materials in the software develop-
ment contracting setting of Banerjee & Duflo (2000)). This allows them to argue that repeat interac-
tion between contacting parties acts as a substitute for high-powered contracts (in offshore oil drill-
ing these are turnkey contracts) (Corts & Singh, 2004). Second, in another study of software industry 
Kalnins and Mayer (2004) found a positive effect of repeat interaction measured on the site level on 
the choice for time-and material contracts, which is in line with the findings of Corts and Singh 
(2004). 
In summary, most of the empirical studies find that the presence of relationships affects the costs of 
monitoring and enforcing contracts and partly alleviates agency problems, which in turn has implica-
tions for allocation mechanism choice.  As prior empirical studies into mechanism choice and con-
tract choice showed that empirical context plays an important role in the discussion of actors’ be-
haviour and the implications of the contracts (Corts et al., 2004; Kalnins et al., 2004; Bajari et al., 
2006), we first introduce the empirical context in which this study is conducted before proceeding to 
the development of hypotheses.  
Context: online marketplace for IT services 
Contracting for software development is a complex endeavor characterized by information asymme-
try with regard to production costs (Whang, 1995), intensive information exchange and heterogene-
ity of vendor quality (Snir et al., 2003), high costs of preparing and evaluating vendors’ proposals 
 9
(Carr, 2003; Snir et al., 2003), and the need for vendor’s specific investments to create value 
(Richmond et al., 1992). Our empirical investigation is set at a leading online marketplace for IT ser-
vices that also shares these characteristics. Examples of online marketplaces for IT service include 
eWork.com, Elance Online, RentACoder.com, and oDesk. These marketplaces provide a platform 
for value-added exchange processes beyond the contract allocation, such as payments, risk mitiga-
tion and service delivery (Kambil & van Heck, 2002; Snir et al., 2003). The volume of this market 
segment is projected to increase from around USD 250 million now to USD 2 billon by 2015 
(Aggarwal, 2007). 
We illustrate the workings of such marketplaces with the example of Elance Online – one of the 
largest online marketplaces for professional services. One of the authors had a professional experi-
ence in the IT outsourcing industry, as well as experience of selling and buying services at this type 
of marketplaces. Additional insights were obtained from communications with an owner of another 
major IT service marketplace as well as several regular buyers of IT services. 
Established in 1998, Elance now hosts around two thousand projects that are simultaneously open 
for bidding across all service categories at any moment of time. Around 60 thousand companies 
regularly use the marketplace to buy services and about half or more of them buy IT services  
(McDougall, 2005). The online marketplace contains a searchable database of vendors and offers 
reverse auctions and negotiations as allocation mechanisms. Buyers are businesses and individuals 
coming predominantly from the US. Vendors are mostly small and medium IT companies and free-
lancers from India, Eastern Europe and Russia. Some vendors have a turnover of more than two 
million USD within Elance.  
The exchange process at the marketplace is organized as follows. First, before buyers and vendors 
are able to enter the exchange, they are required to go through a registration process. Participation 
for buyers is free of charge while a periodic fee applies to vendors. Two allocation mechanisms la-
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belled “open auction” and “invite-only auction” are available to the buyer. A key characteristic of an 
open auction is that any vendor registered at the marketplace can submit a bid in response to an 
RFP posted in an open auction. Submitted bids, including all bid attributes, are either visible to all 
participants or, in a modification labeled “sealed auction”, vendors can only see other bidders’ iden-
tities, without bid details. Buyer can send invitation to individual bidders to submit bids in auctions. 
In such case names of invited bidders are listed on the web page with RFP and bidding details. The 
second type of allocation mechanism used at the marketplace is “invite-only auction”, a mechanism 
buyer normally utilizes when a project is intended for a particular bidder; no other bidders are al-
lowed submit bids in invite-only auctions.  
When posting her RFP as an open or invite-only auction, the buyer specifies procedure parameters, 
such as start and end time, auction type and the type of suppliers who can bid. After the auction 
starts, vendors can submit bids. Bids specify price and estimated delivery time, contain information 
on vendor rating and earnings and a text field where the bidder can provide other relevant informa-
tion. Once a bid has been submitted, it becomes visible to the buyer and other vendors (unless it is a 
sealed auction). During the auction, the buyer can decline or shortlist bids and communicate with 
individual vendors via a private message board.  
 
3. Hypotheses development 
We start with a simple intuition that new buyers at the online marketplace are different from experi-
enced buyers in that they need to familiarize themselves with the marketplace and, especially, with 
the supply side. A straightforward and inexpensive way to explore the marketplace is through com-
paring vendors’ offers at a reverse auction. This kind of intuition is supported by the insights from 
an analytical model that shows that reverse auctions are an important market exploration tool to 
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identify new source of coffee beans supply (Donnet, Jeitschko & Weatherspoon, 2007). Therefore, 
our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H 1: New buyers are more likely to use reverse auction than experienced buyers. 
In an analytical investigation of the procurement of software development services, Whang (1995) 
developed a model of vendor’s bidding in a sequence of reverse auctions for contracts, where ven-
dor’s cost function incorporates the effects of learning that occurs when a vendor works on buyer’s 
previous projects. By learning about the specificity of buyer’s request and being able to modify and 
re-use parts of the source code, the vendor is able to cut the development costs dramatically in sub-
sequent projects. The vendor who wins the first auction can create a lock-in effect and enjoy a com-
petitive advantage against other bidders in subsequent auctions (Whang, 1995), which in turn 
strengthens this lock-in effect. 
Several studies have pinpointed the importance of vendor’s idiosyncratic investments for creation of 
value. For instance, Bakos and Brynjolffson (1993) develop a model, according to which suppliers 
are required to invest in non-contractible characteristics such as innovation, quality, flexibility, trust, 
information exchange and responsiveness to create value (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993). Richmond 
et al (1992) in their study of IS development outsourcing contracts suggest that the value in out-
sourcing contracts is generated through vendors’ specific investments that can be stimulated though 
a profit-sharing rule (Richmond et al., 1992). But why would buyer’s willingness to stay with such 
vendor prevent her from putting new projects to open bidding and selecting a previous vendor?  
First, recent empirical studies into the use of online reverse auctions in industry suggest that when 
exposed to a strong competition in reverse auctions buyers respond with an increased suspicion of 
buyer’s opportunism (Jap, 2003; Jap, 2007). One can suggest that being suspicious of the other par-
ity’ s opportunism does not promote trust, willingness to cooperate and idiosyncratic investments, 
all of which are important factors in the success of IT projects. In line with Bakos and Brynjolffson 
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(1993b), vendors’ willingness to make non-contractible relationship-specific investments is subject to 
their expectation of being able to claim a part of resulting gains in ex-post negotiations. This de-
pends on vendors’ ex-post bargaining power, which becomes higher as the buyer commits to a 
small, rather than large, number of vendors (Bakos et al., 1993). Using negotiations to allocate the 
next project lets the vendor retain more bargaining power, which, although by itself negative for the 
buyer, also signals the willingness to give away some of the value created as a result of vendors’ spe-
cific investments, thus encouraging further relation-specific investments that may ultimately benefit 
the buyer. Second, when considering allocating her next project via auctions or negotiations, the 
buyer might take into account costs associated with setting up an auction and evaluate vendors’ bids. 
As was shown by studies of costly bidding and bid evaluation at online IT service marketplaces, in 
such a setting the buyer incurs costs when evaluating vendor bids; at some point, the expected costs 
of evaluation can even exceed expected gains from the transaction (Carr, 2003; Snir et al., 2003; 
Radkevitch, van Heck & Koppius, 2007). In other words, auctions might be a more costly procedure 
in the context of online marketplaces compared to bilateral negotiations, which is likely to make auc-
tions a less attractive option compared to lower cost negotiation with a familiar vendor. 
Combined, these arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
H 2: More repeat interaction with vendors leads to buyer’s lower preference for auctions and higher preference 
for negotiations. 
Our last hypothesis deals with the effect of vendor performance in buyer’s previous project on the 
choice of allocation mechanism for the next transaction. Due to their complexity and involvement 
of parties that are often distributed across the globe, IT outsourcing projects are often prone to fail-
ures. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers as much as 50% of outsourcing deals fail. Vendor’s fail-
ure to perform well can arise from a multitude of reasons, such as vendor’s poor qualification, pro-
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ject mis-estimation, resource constraints, problems in communication and cooperation between the 
parties during the project (Kern, Willcocks & van Heck, 2002).  
Rather than continue with a vendor who failed, the buyer is more likely to switch the vendor. Re-
verse auctions are an ideal mechanism for performing such a switch, as they allow accessing many 
new vendors, using competition to receive a low price and comparing bidders against one another. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that in such situation the buyer will opt for using reverse auctions rather 
than bilateral negotiations. 
H3: When performance in the most recent project has been unsatisfactory the buyer has a higher preference for 
auctions. 
The next section describes the methodology employed to test the hypothesized relationships.  
 
4. Methodology and Data 
Data 
In order to test the hypotheses we collected transaction data on accomplished projects at a leading 
online marketplace for IT services. One advantage of using datasets from online marketplaces is that 
it “captures unbiased objective data: what players actually did, rather than what they say they did. 
This is preferable to the kind of survey data commonly used in other outsourcing studies which tend 
to be dependent on inaccurate memory, post hoc rationalizations, and subjective attitudinal scales.” 
(Gefen & Carmel, 2008: 13). 
There were several stages in data collection and processing. First, we identified buyers who had at 
least 20 awarded projects awarded at the marketplace (this number included projects awarded in any 
category of the marketplace, not only IT-related). This resulted in a sample of 530 buyers who allo-
cated 20 to 300 projects each, starting from the launch of the marketplace in 1999 until May 2006. 
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Second, we selected projects from the overall category Web development, focusing on the four main 
sub-categories: Web Programming, Web Design and Development, Simple Website and a category labeled 
Other – Web design and development. Other subcategories existed within Web Development, but were 
not numerous enough in our sample to warrant inclusion. We removed projects with incomplete 
data, e.g. where buyer feedback on supplier performance was absent (at this marketplace buyers have 
discretion whether or not to provide feedback to vendors on accomplished projects). To ensure a 
reasonable amount of feedback data for each buyer, we only included buyers where feedback on at 
least 70% of projects was available and at least 10 projects belonged to Web development category.  
This procedure resulted in a dataset containing transactions of 91 buyers with data on 2,081 projects 
worth a total of USD 1,074,315. See Table 1 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics and Table 2 in 
the Appendix for correlations between the variables.  
Measures  
Below we discuss the measures of the allocation mechanism choice, complexity, buyer experience, 
repeat interaction and satisfaction with vendor performance.  
Allocation mechanism choice 
As discussed above, at the online marketplace where our empirical investigation is set the buyer has 
a choice of two allocation mechanisms and we model the allocation mechanism choice as a binary 
variable where “1” is equivalent to the use of auction and “0” denotes the use of negotiations (or 
“invite-only auctions” in the parlance of our marketplace). 
Previously awarded projects 
We use the number of projects awarded by the buyer prior to the current transaction as a straight-
forward measure of how “new” the buyer is to the marketplace. Therefore, a buyer with 0 previously 
awarded projects is accomplishing his first project at the marketplace.  
Repeat interaction 
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We define the number of repeat interactions as the number of transactions the buyer previously had 
with vendors with whom she already transacted more than once. Although prior exchange interac-
tions technically could stretch back many years and/or projects, we focus on the more recent prior 
interactions as these are more likely to influence buyer behavior than interactions many projects ago, 
thus providing a more focused test of the effects of the learning and specific investments that occur 
in early projects. We therefore counted repeat interactions with vendors within buyer’s five most 
recent projects. Therefore, the maximum number of repeat interactions for the buyer is 5, the mini-
mum is 0. However, as a robustness check, we tested our model with an alternative specification of 
prior exchange relationships where we counted vendor re-uses with buyer’s ten most recent projects 
instead of five. The significance and sign of the regression coefficient were practically the same as in 
our main results, but the effect size was even stronger (results available from the authors).  
Performance in the most recent project 
After a project has been accomplished the buyer can assign a rating on 1 to 5 point scale assessing 
vendor’s performance and leave a textual message in vendor’s public profile. As 91% of projects 
have a rating of ‘5’, this suggests that 5 is the implied standard for any satisfactory project. We there-
fore modelled dissatisfaction with past performance as a binary variable where “0” is equivalent to 
the highest possible performance rating (5) in the previous project and “1” accounts for any rating 
below 5. As a robustness check, we also developed and tested two alternative specifications with 
benchmarks for dissatisfaction and 4 and 3, respectively. Testing both alternative specifications pro-
duced results similar to that of the main specification although the effect of dissatisfaction was even 
higher. .  
Control variables 
Past research identified project complexity as an important factor that influences the choice between 
auctions and negotiations (Bajari et al., 2006). The data available at the online marketplace does not 
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allow to judge project complexity directly, but we include dummy variables for each of the four sub-
categories to account for any possible differences in complexity across these subcategories. 
 
5. Analysis  
In order to test the hypotheses we focused on individual transaction as a unit of analysis. The de-
scriptive statistics and correlations among key variables are presented in Table 1and 2. Interesting 
insights emerge from both tables. As can be see in Table 1, buyers have allocated their projects via 
negotiations in 62% of cases. This is roughly similar to the split between auction/negotiation use in 
other studies of allocation mechanism choice (Bajari et al, 2006; Leffer et al, 2004), in both of which 
auctions and negotiations were utilized in approximately equal number of transactions. An average 
project is realized by an experienced buyer with an average of 14.1 previously awarded projects. 
Prior vendors succeed in winning almost 2/3 of projects (65%) The data indicates that negotiations 
serve primary as a means to allocate projects to vendors with whom buyers did business before – 
almost 90% of negotiations are done with such vendors, whereas auctions are won 75.1% by new 
suppliers. The mean of 4.88 of the vendor performance rating indicates that a bulk of vendors (91%) 
receive the highest possible evaluation for their project performance. A possible explanation here 
may be that awarding a vendor the highest rating serves more as a reputational reward for good per-
formance, rather than an objective measure thereof. The correlation coefficients in Table 2 show 
that negotiations are associated with higher project prices as well as with higher winner’s bids. A 
strong association (.66***) is between invite-only auctions and repeat vendors being selected as win-
ners. 
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Analysis Strategy 
Since our dependent variable is binary, we employ a logit formulation and develop a statistical model 
that relates the probability of auction choice Pr(Auction=1) to a set of independent variables (Pro-
jectCategoryDummy, PreviousProject, RepeatProjects and DisatisfactionDummy).  
The dataset has a panel structure and this has implications for the logit estimation procedures. The 
main issue with panel data is that the assumption of independent distribution of the error may not 
hold (Kennedy, 2003), which might result in biased estimated if a standard logit estimation proce-
dure is used. In order to deal with this issue we use three different logistic specifications that to-
gether help test the robustness of our results. The first way of testing is by using pooled logistic re-
gression with a robust procedure with clustering on buyers as the first way to test the hypothesis. 
This procedure allows to obtain conservative standard errors and to avoid their inflation in case they 
are not independent. 
Two other specifications, fixed effects and random effects models, allow to better account for the 
structure of the data by capturing the effect produced by individual buyers on the allocation mecha-
nism choice. The fixed effects model treats the effect of individual buyers as constant, in which case 
it becomes a part of the intercept. By contrast, in a random-effects model the buyer-specific effects 
are assumed to be independently and identically distributed coming from a common normal distri-
bution. Although random effects model produces more efficient estimations than the fixed effects 
model, it relies on stricter assumptions about the nature of the data.  We conduct a Hausman test to 
verify whether the estimates produced by the two models are statistically different. In our case the 
results of the Hausman test showed that the random effects model cannot be rejected. 
Results 
In Table 3 the results of testing logit models are presented. We start the discussion of the results 
with a concise form of the model that includes only the subcategory dummy variables and the vari-
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able for buyer experience (column 1). The initial test provides support for Hypothesis 1. The num-
ber of Previously awarded projects (our proxy for buyer experience) is negatively, associated with the use 
of reverse auctions (-0.0380, p<0.01). Its effect is small however: the marginal effect of an increase 
in Previously awarded projects from 0 to 1 is just around 1% of auction probability decrease. Although 
small, it is in contrast to the results in Bajari et al. (2006). A possible explanation may be that in the 
online marketplace context investigated here, the positive effect of  buyer experience on the use of 
negotiations is related to the fact that when buyers start their activities at the online marketplace, 
auctions serve as a tool to explore the marketplace, by getting to know vendors and learning about 
the bidding process. As buyers acquire experience, from exploration of the marketplace they switch 
to exploitation of their knowledge and relationships they built with vendors, where negotiations is a 
more appropriate instrument.  
Next, we add the exploratory variable Buyer dissatisfaction dummy to the regression in order to test Hy-
pothesis 3. The new model (column 2) marginally gains in explanatory power (Pseudo R² = 0.0668). 
The regression coefficient for Buyer dissatisfaction dummy reveals a large positive effect on the use of 
reverse auctions (1.1211, p<0.01). This result provides strong support for Hypotheses 3 that pre-
dicted that buyer’s dissatisfaction with vendor’s performance in the most recent project provokes 
buyer’s desire to switch to a different vendor – an intention that is better served by an auction. It is 
quite telling that the marginal effect of Buyer dissatisfaction dummy changing from 0 (the rating assigned 
to vendors is 5) to 1 (the rating assigned to vendors is less than 5) is high – the predicted probability 
of buyer auctioning her next project increases by as much as 27%. 
The third model presented in column 3 of Table 3 regresses the probability of auction choice on the 
full set of the independent variables. The number of observations in this model is 1,780, since a sub-
sample of buyers with at least 5 awarded projects has been used for testing. In comparison to the 
previous model, this model demonstrates a sharp increase in the explained variance to the level of 
 19
25.99% of the variation. The regression coefficient for Repeat projects is significantly and negatively 
related to the choice for reverse auction (-0.8262, p<0.01), which means that Hypothesis 2 is sup-
ported. As the analysis of the marginal reflects reveals in the same column, the increase of the num-
ber of repeat projects (which the buyer conducts within five latest projects) by one leads to 12.8% 
decrease in the probability of choosing to auction her next project. By contrast, the coefficient for 
Buyer dissatisfaction dummy loses significance. This is related to that fact that projects done by relatively 
inexperienced buyers (with less than five awarded projects) are now excluded from the analysis, yet 
these are also the projects where dissatisfaction with vendor’s performance is more likely due to the 
lack of experience and fit with the appropriate vendor. Also, the coefficient for Previously awarded pro-
jects loses its significance, most likely due to the effect of buyer’s experience in the models (which 
was small to begin with) in columns 3-5 is now absorbed by the Repeat projects variable. 
Columns (4) and (5) display the results of hypotheses testing using random effects and fixed effects 
logit models. There are 1,357 observations in the fixed effects model compare to 1,780 in the ran-
dom effects model, as the former model excludes buyers that do not have variation in the dependent 
variable. Qualitatively, the results are very similar. The support for Hypothesis 2 has been provided 
once again. Both random effects and fixed effects models demonstrate support for Hypothesis 3 
that links buyer’s dissatisfaction with vendor performance in the most recent project with the choice 
for auction in the subsequent project. The coefficients for Buyer dissatisfaction dummy in both models 
are positive and significant (0.7391, p<0.01 and 0.7640, p<0.01). The analysis of marginal effects 
shows that when buyer’s rating for supplier performance in the last project is less than 5, the buyer is 
15.5% (random effects model) and 0.065% (fixed effects model) more likely to use auction the next 
transaction. 
Overall, the conclusion of the analysis is that Hypothesis 1 (on the negative effect of buyer experi-
ence on the use of auctions) finds partial support. New buyers are more likely to use auctions than 
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experienced buyers but the effect of marginal increase in experience on the decrease of negotiation 
use is quite weak and seems to be overrun by repeat interaction, when the latter is included in the 
model. Hypothesis 2 (on the relationship between repeat interaction and preference for negotiations 
in the subsequent project) and Hypothesis 3 (on the relationship between dissatisfaction with vendor 
performance in the previous project and preference for auctions in the subsequent project) find 
broad support. In the next section we discuss the implication of the findings.  
 
6. Discussion 
The findings of this study have a number of implications for research and practice. First, from the 
research perspective, this study not only extends the body of knowledge on the use of different allo-
cation mechanisms. It also provides further support of an emerging perspective in the research on 
auction that argues for focusing not only on a discrete transaction when trying to explain partici-
pants’ behaviour in auction outcomes but also on the business context in which such transaction 
occurs (Rothkopf et al., 1994; Pinker et al., 2003; Elmaghraby, 2007). We showed that taking into 
account a historical perspective of actor’s exchange interaction, more specifically – prior repeat ex-
change interactions, results in valuable insights into the motivation of the behavior of economic 
agents. Second, these results contribute to the debate on the use of online reverse auctions in indus-
trial practice. A viewpoint shared by a number of researchers is that online reverse auctions, if im-
plemented “with care”, can be utilized with the incumbent supply base without necessarily damaging 
existing relationships (Jap, 2002). Indeed, previous studies found that incumbent suppliers are more 
likely to win auctions than new suppliers and enjoy higher prices (Zhong & Wu, 2006), and that in-
cumbents might be still willing to make idiosyncratic investments after reverse auctions even though 
they might start to suspect the buyer in trying to opportunistically decrease prices (Jap, 2003). A 
study in the banking industry revealed that, although the effect of supplier marketing program has a 
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higher effect of buyer’s switching decision, personal relationships still do play a role as counter-
weight for switching (Wathne, Biong & Heide, 2001). Although these prior findings look very plau-
sible, a broader perspective on the use of online reveres auctions taken in our study reveals that buy-
ers do not think reverse auctions to be very appropriate in the context of longer buyer-supplier rela-
tionships. We found and quantified a clear pattern of decreasing use of reverse auctions as the ex-
change relationships between buyers and vendors become more extensive, at least in terms of the 
number of previous exchange interactions. The decrease of the probability of using reverse auction 
for the next project (although somewhat dependent on the model specification employed) could be 
almost 16% per additional past repeat project with a vendor. Apparently, this is a sign that buyers do 
not see reverse auctions commensurable with the trust, vendor’s learning and idiosyncratic invest-
ments amassed during the prior interaction and rather rely on negotiations to reap these benefits. By 
contrast, buyers are turning to reverse auctions when they need to sever relationships with their in-
cumbent vendor – being dissatisfied with vendor’s performance can boost the probability of auc-
tioning their next project by as much as 27%.  
These results can be useful guidelines for procurement managers who have a full discretion to use 
different allocation mechanisms with their incumbent supply base, especially in contexts where the 
knowledge and investments of as well as the trust to incumbent vendors are important for creating 
business value.  
At the same time, the results of the present study should be generalized with caution. Unlike previ-
ous studies on the choice of allocation mechanism and contract choice that explored the empirical 
context in industries such as offshore oil drilling, hospital procurement or contracting for large-scale 
IT services, this study explores small-scale IT service projects in an online environment. One impli-
cation for the generalizability of results here is that larger companies might have formalized rules for 
the choice of allocation mechanisms that might prevent them from easily changing from one 
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mechanism to another. For example, several studies described procurement auctions of electronic 
components or automotive parts, where buyers would use exclusively reverse auctions to choose 
suppliers (Jap, 2003; Zhong et al., 2006). This is also true for public procurement, e. g. of construc-
tion services, where buyers always have to use tenders when certain criteria (e.g. monetary volume of 
the project) are met (Bajari et al., 2006). Another implication is that the transaction costs can be 
lower in the online environment that can make switching vendors easier. For example, these are the 
costs of buyer’s searching for new vendors, which are lower in online markets (Bakos, 1997). 
In addition to the concerns about generalizability, this study has several other limitations. First, the 
Web Development section of online marketplace we studied is but one of the areas of the market-
place. It is not clear whether our findings would equally hold for other professional services such as 
tax consulting, legal advice or language transaction where the importance of buyer’s learning, trust 
and idiosyncratic investments might be lower than in the case of IT service. Second, the size of the 
contracts we studied is much smaller than the size of typical B2B software development contracts. 
As Gefen and Carmel (2008) note in a study that uses data from a marketplace similar to ours: “Such 
contracts span from three to six order of magnitude larger than the typical Rent A Coder contract 
and thus different marketplace behavior is likely” (Gefen et al., 2008: 11). The third limitation comes 
from the fact that it is difficult to compare the effects of prior relationships on the allocation 
mechanism choice to factors identified by prior studies, such as contract complexity (Bajari et al., 
2006). The measures for complexity available at our marketplace lack the refinement necessary for 
drawing such conclusions. Finally, our dataset has been limited exclusively to projects that have been 
awarded and executed, and as previous studies in a similar marketplace pointed out, as much as 60% 
of posted auctions never result in a contract between the buyer and vendor (Snir et al., 2003; Radke-
vitch et al., 2007). The explanations offered by those authors are mainly in terms of costly bidding 
and costly bid evaluation, but both papers also found that projects with higher dollar value are 
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slightly more likely to not be awarded. This implies that the auction part of our sample is likely to 
have somewhat smaller projects compared to the overall population of auctioned projects. However, 
this only provides a stricter test of our hypotheses as the risk associated with high-value projects 
would make them theoretically more likely to be allocated through a negotiation rather than an auc-
tion (although since data on the value of negotiated projects is not available at the marketplace, we 
cannot test this hypothesis). It does suggest that a misfit between project value and allocation mech-
nism employed might be an additional explanation for the high percentage of failed auctions, but 
this is beyond the scope of this paper,   
 
7. Conclusions  
Procurement transactions often require a decision on the choice of a mechanism to allocate contract 
to a vendor to be made at a very early stage. As prior literature has demonstrated, the choice of the 
allocation mechanism is of crucial importance since the allocation mechanism affects a number of 
critical aspects of transactions such as information exchange, price and buyer-supplier relationships 
(Jap, 2002; Jap, 2003; Bajari et al., 2006). All these factors affect performance in the exchange.  
Previous theoretical and empirical studies on allocation mechanism choice focused on transaction 
attributes such as product complexity, buyer’s preference for quality, availability of suppliers and 
cost of conducing auctions as factors determining the mechanism choice (Manelli et al., 1995; Bo-
naccorsi et al., 2000; Leffler et al., 2003; Bajari et al., 2006). This means that until now the literature 
considered only discrete exchange situations ignoring the historical context in which exchange oc-
curs in the real world. This has been a considerable gap for both theory and practice, as repetition is 
typical for procurement transactions (Pinker et al., 2003; Elmaghraby, 2007). This study aimed to 
bridge this gap and to extend the literature on the choice of allocation mechanisms by studying the 
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effect of buyer’s repeat interactions with vendors on the choice between reverse auctions and bilat-
eral negotiations.  
This study makes three key contributions. First, we found and quantified the effect of buyer’s repeat 
exchange interaction with vendors on the choice of allocation mechanism in buyer’s next transaction 
at an online marketplace for IT services. We also found that in cases when the buyer needs to ex-
plore the supply at the marketplace or when she is dissatisfied with the vendor performance in the 
most recent project, the use of auctions in the subsequent project becomes more likely. These find-
ings extend the body of knowledge on allocation mechanism choice.  
Our second contribution deals with the new insights on the use of online reverse auctions. Buyers 
who enjoyed prior repeat interaction with vendors and are satisfied with their performance, are very 
unlikely to start experimenting with reverse auctions. By contrast, reverse auctions seem to serve as a 
tool that new buyers use to explore the marketplace; or, alternatively, to compare and switch to new 
suppliers in case vendor performance has become not satisfactory. This finding seems to challenge 
the insights of some prior studies that suggested that reverse auctions are likely to be used as a 
“wake-up call for the extant supply base” (Jap, 2002). However, more research is needed to find out 
to what extent these findings hold in other empirical contexts.  
The third contribution consists of exploring an empirical context different from that utilized by 
prior studies on allocation mechanism choice. This allowed us to extend the study of allocation 
mechanism choice into the online environment that hosts an increasing number of transactions in 
recent decades. In addition, the use of the real transaction data from an online marketplace helped 
overcome a limitation of previous research that studied the link between reverse auctions and buyer-
supplier relationships using survey data. In our study, rather than relying on the information about 
actors’ subjective intentions and perceptions we could operate with the objective facts of actual 
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transactions, showing that the increasing availability of large, real-world transaction data offers great 
opportunities for building empirically valid theories of B2B market behavior. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
  N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Allocation mechanism (Neg. = 0; Auct. = 1) 2,081 0 1 .63844 .4967
Project Price 2,081 5 15,150 516.25 1008.91
Winner’s bid 2,033 1 8,750 354.18 502.77
Number of previously awarded projects 2,081 0 65 14.10 13.07
Winner is recurrent vendor 2,081 0 1 .65 .48
Percentage of previous projects with repeat
vendors 
1,980 .00 1.00 .3893 .4144
USD in projects with repeat vendors 1,980 0 52,660 4,162.19 6,423.18
Satisfaction 2,066 1 5 4.88 .53
Satisfaction with last project < 5 2,081 0 1 .09 .29
Satisfaction with last project < 4 2,081 0 1 .04 .19
Satisfaction with last project < 3 2,081 0 1 .03 .16
Days since the start of the 1st auction 2,081 0 2,321 548.56 481.09
Repeat projects within 5 last projects 1,780 0 5 3.34 1.63
Category “Web design and development” 2,081 .00 1.00 .4493 .4975
Category “Simple website” 2,081 .00 1.00 .2220 .4157
Category “Web programming” 2,081 .00 1.00 .2960 .4566
Category “Other – web design” 2,081 .00 1.00 .0308 .1727
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 Table 2. Pearsons’ Correlations 
  Auction 
Price 
(USD) Satisfact. Win bid 
Winner is 
repeat 
vendor 
Satisfaction 
most recent 
project < 5 
Repeat pro-
jects within 5 
last projects 
Previously 
awarded 
projects Cat SW 
Cat 
WDD 
Price (USD) -.099(**)  
  .000  
Satisfaction -.203(**) .009  
  .000 .668  
Win bid -.120(**) .588(**) -.011  
  .000 .000 .626  
Winner is repeat ven-
dor -.660(**) .041 .215(**) .069(**)  
  .000 .063 .000 .002   
Satisfaction most re-
cent project < 5 .173(**) -.017 -.161(**) .002 -.208(**)  
  .000 .436 .000 .926 .000   
Repeat projects within 
5 last projects -.551(**) .027 .206(**) .043 .635(**) -.258(**) 
  .000 .253 .000 .074 .000 .000  
Previously awarded 
projects -.214(**) .054(*) .092(**) .022 .236(**) -.079(**) .270(**)
  .000 .014 .000 .326 .000 .000 .000  
Cat SW -.085(**) .010 .014 .076(**) .099(**) -.034 .151(**) .105(**)
  .000 .659 .522 .001 .000 .116 .000 .000  
Cat WDD -.025 -.029 .030 -.057(*) .001 -.010 .017 .024 -.483(**)
  .260 .189 .178 .011 .975 .642 .476 .281 .000  
Cat Other -.066(**) -.027 .021 -.020 .038 -.007 .015 .030 -.095(**) -.161(**)
  .002 .223 .338 .364 .082 .739 .530 .169 .000 .000
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 3. The effect of project complexity, experience and prior performance and prior exchange interaction on the probability 
of choosing auction as an allocation mechanism: logistic regressions. 
Dependent variable: 
Auction 
(1) Logit with robust 
standard errors and 
clustering on buyers 
(2) Logit with robust 
standard errors and 
clustering on buyers 
(3) Logit with robust 
standard errors and 
clustering on buyers 
(4) Logit with 
random effects 
for buyers 
(5) Logit with 
conditional fixed 
effects for buyers 
Previously awarded 
projects 
-0.0380*** 
(0.0114) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.0110) 
0.0042 
(0.0094) 
0.0034 
(0.0077) 
-0.0005 
(0.0079) 
Buyer dissatisfaction 
dummy 
 1.1211*** 
(0.2584) 
0.3962 
(0.2671) 
0.7391*** 
(0.2683) 
0.7640*** 
(0.2696) 
Repeat projects   -0.8262*** 
(0.0835) 
-0.8981*** 
(0.0646) 
-0.7866*** 
(0.0660) 
“Simple website” 
dummy 
-0.6046** 
(0.3065) 
-0.5870* 
(0.3095) 
-0.4289 
(0.3721) 
-0.4853* 
(0.2788) 
-0.4016 
(0.3045) 
“Web design and 
development” dummy 
-0.3717 
(0.2813) 
-0.3578 
(0.2781) 
-0.2372 
(0.2958) 
-0.2833 
(0.2343) 
-0.1908 
0.2602 
“Other – Website 
dev.” dummy 
-1.2075** 
(0.5770) 
-1.2142** 
(0.5854) 
-1.4433*** 
(0.3908) 
-1.4817** 
(0.5747) 
-1.2287** 
(0.6030) 
Const  0.3518 
(0.2742) 
0.2200 
(0.2775) 
2.0004*** 
(0.2976) 
2.0061*** 
(0.3084) 
 
Number observations 2,081 2,081 1,780 1,780 1,357 
Number of buyers 91 91 91 91 62 
Wald Chi² 22.08 51.35 150.90 234.83 238.50  
(LR chi2) 
Pseudo R² 0.0493 0.0668 0.2599 0.3421 0.192 
Log pseudolikelihood/ 
Log likelihood   
Log 
pseudolikelihood -
1317.986 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -
1293.672 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -
840.907 
Log likelihood 
 -713.622 
Log likelihood  
-501.733 
Notes:  Dependent variable – probability of auction choice. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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